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HYPOTHESES OH THE NATIONALITIES FACTOR 
IH SOVIET RELIGIOUS POLICY 
by Pedro Ramet 
Pedro Ramet , a native of London ,  England , has l ived 
almost half of his l i fe in Europe--chiefly in England , 
Austria ,  Germany , and Yugos lavia . He received his A . B .  
in philosophy from Stanford Univers ity , his M . A .  in 
international rel ations from the University of 
Arkansa s ,  and his Ph. D .  in political scienc e ,  in 1 98 1 ,  
from UCLA . H e  i s  currently an Ass istant Profes sor in 
the Henry M. Jackson School of International S tudie s ,  
University o f  Washi ngton . He i s  the author o f  Sadat 
and the Kremlin ( 1 980) and Nationalism and Federalism 
in Yugoslavia ,  1963-1983 ( 1984 ) , and editor of 
Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European 
Politics ( 1984 )  . Thi s  es say wa s written for a 
conference on religion in the US SR sponsored by 
Religion in Communist Dominated Areas (RCDA) and wil l  
be appearing i n  a forthcoming i s sue o f  that j ournal . 
One of the differences between the Soviet outlook and the Western , 
whi ch confronts us the moment we undertake to examine Soviet pol itic al 
behavior , is that whereas Westerners tend to view ' policy ' nebulously , 
viewi ng  it usually as  a continuing process of establ i shing fixed 
procedur es and expectations in a given realm , in Soviet terms ' policy ' is 
more often seen as a program designed to eradicate a problem ,  to solve it 
absolutely . As such , the erad ication of the problem is expe cted also to 
end the need for a pol i cy--whi ch reveals that the Soviet interpre tation 
of 'policy ' i s  distinctly utopian. Policy has no other raison d ' etre than 
the sol ution of problems ,  for the Soviet s ,  and both problems and policies 
ar e assigned fixed value s ,  i . e .  they are def ined ideologically . This 
concept of pol i cy is underpinned by the now strictly 'honorific doctrine 
of the witheri ng away of the state , whi ch holds that once certain 
problems have been solved , there would be no further need for policy and 
hence the state apparatus could disappear . In approachi ng "policy "  
matters,  the Soviet approach is t o  proceed from a definition o f  pol icy , 
whi ch embraces a defi nition of the problem . These definitions ,  in turn , 
yield a set of prerequisites for the solution of the problem , and this 
se t of pr erequi sites itsel f implies some concept of the instruments and 
ta rgets of poli cy . 
Soviet rel igious pol icy is seen as a component in the broader 
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project of e radicat ing atta chment to pre-communi st culture ( in Soviet 
pa rl ance , "bui lding the New Soviet Man" ) and of creating a unified , 
" SOvi e t "  culture . P rivate v i ews , as alternative ideologies , are obstacles 
to the success of thi s proj ect. Withi n  thi s framework , rel igion is seen 
as private prejudice having Eoots in pre-bourgeois and bourgeois society . 
1 Viewed in thi s context, the oft-tout ed Soviet guarantee that religion 
is the private af fair of the individual is seen to have a useful 
co rol lary , viz . that , by virtue of being a "private" affair , it is not 
public a nd hence , religious insti tutions enj oy no publ ic rights or 
pr eroga t ives ,  have no function in publ i c  life , and are best restri cted to 
purely liturgical functions. 2 And , insofa r as thi s private af fair i s ,  in 
fac t ,  a privat e affliction , it becomes the right and duty of communists 
to take concerted measur e s  to eradicate "pre-s cientific consciousness . "  
Or , as a communist j udge in Czechoslovakia once put it , " In our socialist 
so ciety a l l  the cond itions have been establ i shed so that all the citizen s  
ca n ge t ri d of their pr ejudice s ,  including their religious bel i efs . " 3 
Moreover ,  once religion i s  defined as a "vestige " of pre-bourgeois 
and bourgoi s  society , its el imination , in cond itions of " the bui lding of 
comnunism , "  becomes a matter of definition , which is to say , beyond 
que stion. Accordingly , " unde r developed sociali sm the sphere of rel igion 
is increasingly narrowing , " 4 as increasing numbers of people are 
" liberated " from rel igiosity . 5 
The three chi ef components in the Soviet understanding of rel igion 
identify the pre requi site factors for the eliminati on of religion . As a 
private af fa ir , it i s  to be dislodged from the publi c  sphere , regulated , 
r egiste r ed ,  and contro l l ed . The Soviets appreciate the organically 
po litical character of rel igion and the consequences of depoliticizing 
rel igion,  as Zachary Irwin has pointed out : "Religion becomes pol itics 
wh en it seek s  to externali ze intrinsic obligation through the fact of a 
r egime , and poli tics bec omes religion in the apotheosis of a popular 
et ho s .  Rel igion atrophi es without relevance to social facts , whether or 
not they are independent of a regime . "6 As a pre j udice , it is to be 
combat ted by systematic atheist propaganda. As a vestige of pre-bourgeois 
and bourgeois society , its links with national sentiment must be 
shatte r ed ,  and national i dentity founded on a new basis--for the Soviets , 
di ffe rences in language .  Th e  disappearance of rel igion has traditionally 
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been associated with the achi evement of " full communism" --an association 
whi ch would postpone the disappearance of religion to the indefinite 
future .  Y et a recent article in Komsomolskaya pravda c alled for "a more 
deternd.ned s t ruggle" against religion , on the argument that 
7 mus t  di sappear of itsel f in about twel ve years . " 
"religi on 
Soviet religious pol i cy has been tactically inconsistent (with 
peri ods of relaxation and pe riods of intensified struggle)  , but 
strategi cally . 8 consJ.stent . Di f ferences across time ( e . g .  pre- and 
post-1 9 28 )  and across denominations are tactical inconsistencies directed 
towa rd the same ends , but ref lecting contextual di fferences and 
dif ferences in opportuni ty .  The Russian Orthodox Church , for example , is 
far mo re sus ceptible to manipulation , i nfiltration , and subversion than 
is the cathol ic Church in Lithuania ; henc e ,  an entire range of pol icy 
in struments becomes available in the former cas e ,  which are not available 
in the latte r .  
A s  noted before , policy in a specific sphere i s  seen by the Soviets 
as but an aspect of their larger utopian project.  Hence , religious pol icy 
is not an autonomous ·realm . Its  goals and value s do not ari s e  within any 
autonomous framework but only within the broader context of "the building 
of comimlnism . " The Soviets conceive of pol icy as a seamless web , a united 
" front , "  so that the relation of religious poli cy to nationalities pol i cy 
9 can only be , in Leninist terms , a mutually supportive one . soviet 
nationalities pol i cy , whi ch defines national ity as the consciousness 
as sociated with a shared language , culture , territory , and economic 
1 . f 10 h h h . d .  ff b . h d f l. e ,  a s  soug t to erode et nJ.c J. erences y promotJ.ng t e sprea o 
Russian l anguage and culture , fostering ethnic interma rriage , assail ing 
tr ad itional customs and ceremonies , and 
. . 
1 . . 11 h ' l J.nterregJ.ona IDJ.gratJ.on . Hence , w J. e 
stimulating ( even forcibly )  
permitting the Moscow patri-
archate to continue to publ i sh Russian-language materials , the Soviet 
state banned publ ication of the Ukrainian-l anguage monthly , Pravoslavnyj 
visnyk in the 1 9 60 s ,  and except in western Ukraine,  Russian is the 
language of the sermons in Orthodox chu'rches throughout Ukraine as well 
as the language of Ukrainian ecclesiastical administration . 
12  Rel igious 
pol i cy ,  in thi s way , is attuned to the needs of nationalities pol icy .  
Seen i n  thi s l ight, the disjunction o f  rel igion and nationali sm 
as sumes critical importance not only from the standpoint of the athei st 
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de s ire to weaken collective attachment to the ' folk ' rel igion, but also 
from the standpoint of the as similatory drive to enervate nati onal 
identity and to reduce it to mere diffe rences in crafts ,  costumes ,  and 
dance s .  Sovi et dissident Va lentyn Moroz saw this quite clearly when he 
wrote that 
the mo st convenient way of de stroyi ng [ th e ]  founda­
tions of a nation i s  to employ the pretext of fighting 
aga inst the Church . The Church has grown into cultural 
l i fe so de eply that it is imposs ible to touch it with­
out damaging the spiritual structure of the nation . It 
i s  impos s ible to imagine traditional values without 
th e Church . . .  [ Hence , ] the struggle a��inst the Church 
me ans a struggle aga i nst the culture .  
The purpose of thi s paper i s  to set forth hypotheses on the nation­
alities factor in Soviet religious pol i cy and , in the proce s s ,  to rela te 
rel igi on and nationali sm analyt i cally , providing the conceptua l basis for 
empirical l inkage s .  Given the number of hypotheses being outlined , it 
will not be possible to provide conclusive arguments , only suggestive 
one s.  The hypotheses are aggregated into three broad groups . Hypotheses 
1-3 are concerned with the orientations of religious groups and 
nationalists toward each other.  Hypotheses 4-5 are concerned with 
processes associated with modernizat ion in the Soviet Union. Hypotheses 
6 -1 1  are concerned with Soviet religious pol i cy per se . 
Hypothesis 1 :  Nationally _!inked religions of larger nationalities are 
more threatening than those of smaller nationalities . 
Whi le additional fa ctors have to be added into the calculation in 
order to capture the c omplexity of the s i tuation accurately , it appears 
that , wh ere the rel igion/nationalism symbiosis i s  concerned , the Soviets 
have been most troubled by Ukrainian catholicism and Central Asian Islam. 
Nei ther the nationally intense catho l icism of the Lithuanians nor the 
Islam of the sma l ler peoples of the US SR produces fulminations as 
feveri sh as those inspir ed by Ukrainian Uniates and underground Islam in 
Ce ntral Asia. 14 In the case of the latter , the Soviets have often sought 
to blame heightened Islamic consciousness on the influence and activities 
of foreign groups- -as in the case of an article by A. Ortigov in the 
Februa ry 1 5 , 1 983 is sue of Sovet Uzbekistan and in the case of an article 
by A. Do ev in the February 1 984 i s sue of the Kirghiz edition of 
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K . 15 ' 1 
. ommun�st . Moreover , wh� e the Sov�ets banned the Ukrainian Uniates , 
the Li thuanian cathol ic Church has been allowed to continue legal 
operation. 
Hypothesis 2 :  In the case of nationalities with more than one ' national 
religion , '  � regime will � to view � ' national religion ' � � 
dangerous than the other . 
At least four nations in the communist world have mo re than one 
'national religion, ' i . e .  more than one religious organization claims to 
be the protector and traditional cultural organization of the group : 
Hungary ( catholicism and Calvinism ) , Romania (Orthodoxy and Greek-Rite 
catholicism) , Ukraine (Greek-Rite [ Uni ate ] Catholicism and Orthodoxy ) ,  
and the Ossetians (Orthodoxy and Islam ) . In two of the se cases , one of 
the compe ting rel igions has been banned outright (Greek-Rite catho l icism 
in Ranania and Ukraine) . I n  Hungary , the Calvinist Church accommodated 
it sel f  to communi sm much sooner , jus t as Orthodoxy did where the 
Ossetians are concerned . The religious group seen as "more threatening" 
is so identified ,  in each case , on the basis of its greater resistance to 
cooptation and ,  in the Ukrainian cas e ,  al so on the bas is of its l inkage 
with centri fuga l ideology . I n  Ukraine , the Ukrainian Orthodox have also 
been blunt ed ,  by be ing uni ted organizationally into the Rus sian Orthodox 
Church . 
Hypothesis 3 :  Nationalists tend !£ identify � single religion with their 
particula! nationality group and are therefore antagoni stic toward 
proselytization by splinter sects ; the splinter sects are often 
antagonistic £! indifferent toward national feel ing . 
Amo ng L ithuanian nationalists , for instance , the editors of Au�rele 
insist that all Lithuanians should be cathol ic and argue that " the 
[ Lithua nian ] nation wil l  remain alive only as long as the catholic Church 
remains alive. " 16 Whatever erode s the strength of the Catholic Church in 
Li thuani a--whether atheization or proselytization by other groups--is 
ipso !� i nimi cal to the nation as a collective entity . The identifi­
cation of national ity wi th religion is so strong among the Mus lims of 
Central Asia 
ananalous and 
as to rende r the 
. h ibl 17 �ncompr e ens e ,  
concept of religionless nationality 
and Chri stian churches are rightly 
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v i ewed as indi fferent toward the national feel ing of Central Asians . 
Among Ukrainians , Protestant sects such as Jehovah ' s  Witnesses have no 
interest in Ukrainian national ism and therefore often function as de 
f f . f . . 
18 
nd f . . 1 . h acto age nts o Rus s �  �cat�on. A or Rus s�an nat�ona �sts , t e 
Russian Orthodox Church has o ften been viewed as the most authentically 
Rus sian institution .  I nde ed , 
in a mul ti-national setting even non-bel ieving 
Russ ians wil l  often call themselves Orthodox to 
cl early mark o ff their national identity from that of 
Soviet c i tizens of non-Russian origi n .  This same close 
bond between Orthodox rel igion and Rus sian nationality 
wa s also forged by the short-lived , pol itical ly 
oppositional Berdyaev Circle whi ch wanted to carry 
this connection to the extreme by founding a new 
political order on the Church . Baptism in the Orthodox 
Church . • .  i s  regarded by many as a national cus tom. 
Rather than symbolising a stri ctly religious commit­
ment , baptism i s  often appr�§ched as an act of 
af f irming a national trad i tion . 
Corollary 3a : Assaults on the primary religious organization of �-
Rus sian peoples � to be viewed as attempts to de-nationalize them � � 
preparation for eventual Russification . 
Thi s follows directly from the foregoi ng  evidence and indicates that 
not only the regime but the people as well appreciate the extent to which 
atheism i s  de s igned to serve considerations of nationalities policy and , 
even more , fear the implications of atheism for the preservation of their 
national identities . As saults on the Rus sian Orthodox Church are viewed , 
s imilarly , by Russian Slavophile s ,  as attempts to denationalize the 
20 
Rus s ian people and cut them off from their non-Soviet past . 
Hypothesis 4 :  Interregional migratory dispersion weakens ethnic con-
sciousness and attenuates the reinforcement which religion provides to 
nationality . 
To take one example of thi s ,  Ukrainians and Belorus sians who are 
moved to Central Asian cities f i nd Russian-language school s ,  f ilms , and 
pe ri odicals read i ly available , but find little in their own language s .  
Th e  Ukrainian a nd B elorussian Orthodox Church organizations have both 
be en suppressed , and hence Orthodox Sl avs in Central Asia have only the 
Rus sian Orthodox Chur ch available . 21  Moreover , Ukrainians and Belo-
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russians are viewed by the Central Asians as simply "Russian s , " much in 
the way that Aus trians are often viewed by Sl avs as "Germans . "  Simi larly , 
a transplanted Lithuania n ,  cut off from his/her homeland , is under great 
pressur e to assimi late , and likewise may f ind that the avai lable cathol ic 
chur ches are not Lithuanian in cultur e .  The transplantation of the 
Crimean Tatars seems to have had the opposite effect , undoubtedly because 
rather than being dispersed they were moved as an entire community and 
have continued to exist as a compact community . Interregional migration 
is most effective in dissolving ethnic consciousness when the community 
it sel f is terminated through d i spersion . 
Hypothesis 5 :  Modernization is in some ways more threatening to 
traditional Christian religion (Catholicism , Orthodoxy) than to � forms 
of Protestantism .  
Even aside from the general supposition that modernizat ion creates 
new social needs and new social challenges to which new sects ari se as 
re sponses, modernization produces ethnic mixing and therefore dilutes the 
ethnic advocacy role to whi ch the ' traditiona l '  churches in the USSR have 
la id claim . Tradi tional rel igion arose as the moral underpinning for 
political units and responded to people ' s  need for explanations and 
jus tifications of authority . Traditional rel igious institutions also 
provided surrogate political resources for sub jugated peoples at certain 
points in their devel opment , but as seculari zation proceeds , the appeal 
of churches as agents of communal mobilization recedes .  
22 
On the other 
hand, the new sects may be impervious to this aspect of modernization in 
that their origins , uses, and political orientations have been whol ly 
di f ferent and they have never aspired (unless the Pokutnyky are taken to 
23 be a "P rotestant" s ect ) to communal mobi lization of the ethnic group. 
Lenin,  for his par t ,  several times gave vent to his bel ief that a 
"mode rnized " rel igious gr oup posed a gr eater obstacle to the communist 
party than "traditional " rel igion. 24 
Hypothesis 6 :  Tactical changes in religious policy and in nationalities 
policx_ tend to coincide , s ince they are parts of a seamless web of 
interrelated policies. 
The ' NEP ' pe riod wa s a pe riod of relaxation in both the ethnic 
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sphere a nd the religious sphere . This was rever sed between 1 928 and 1929 
with the passage of a new l aw on rel igion, the dispatch of new cadres to 
administer the non-Russian areas,  a re-Russification of Ukraine and 
Bel oru s sia , and new pressur e on rel igious organizations.  The wartime 
reha bi litation of Russian nationalism coinc ided with a partial rehabili­
ta tion of the Rus s ian Orthodox Church , jus t  as Khrushchev' s subs equent 
ant i-rel igious drive of 1959-1964 coinc ided with the launching of a 
campaign to intensify linguistic Rus s ification , with the 22nd CPSU 
Congress in 1 961 officially procl aiming a drive to merge the nations of 
th e US SR . Unde r  Brezhn ev, resolut ions taken by the CPSU Central Committee 
in 19 7 9  specifically signal led a toughening in both athei st and 
25 
in ternationalist propaganda , and the dri ve to assail Mus l im practices 
coinc ided with renewed pa rty concern about shifting demographics in 
Central Asia. 
It i s  not to be supposed , of cour s e ,  that every change of pol icy in 
one of these spheres necessari ly entail s  change in the other .  But since 
the two policy realms are united by broad overlapping obj ectives 
( Sovietization , secula rization, social homogenization) and by certain 
common instruments ( ideology , intermarri age , urbanization, Rus sifica­
tion) , it i s  natural that change in one sphere of pol icy should sugge st 
change also 'in the other , or--to put it another way--change in either 
sphere is apt to reflect change in the approach to certain obj ectives and 
in struments common to both policy spheres . 
Corollary 6a : Anti-religious campaigns � be expected !£ coincide with 
increased vigilance against divisive nationalism ,  and vice �· 
Corollary 6b : Foreign £Olicy pressures �nd perturbations which excite 
clampdowns �E relaxations in either th� religious or the nationalities 
sphere �� �pt to excite complementary activity in the other �phere � 
well . 
Evidence for both corollaries may be found in the Czechoslovak 
crisi s  of 1 9 68 and the Polish euphoria of 1 980-1 981 . The liberalization 
of Czecho slovak politics in 1 96 8  excited a wave of expression of 
nationalist discontent in the Ukraine and also s timulated the revival of 
open activity on the part of the banned Uni ate Church . In response , the 
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regime o rganized a number of elaborate anti-religious seminars in 1 968 
and 196 9,  especially in the Transcarpathian oblast.  In the wake of Pol i sh 
dis turbances 1 980-1 981 ,  there were anti-Russian demonstrations in several 
Baltic cities and Latvian Party Secretary A. E .  Vos s openly fretted , in 
January 1 981 , over the spread of "bourgeois nationali sm" in the Soviet 
West. Once again,  anti-Rus sian nationalism wa s linked with the churche s ,  
a nd  once again,  anti-religious seminars and meetings were organized in 
th . 26 e SovJ.et West. 
Hypothesis 7 :  Regional variations in nationalities policy have impact on 
regional expressions of religious policr . 
Th e  targeting of Ukrainians and Bel orussians for faster rates of 
as siroi l ation27 is refl ected in the di sappearance of their autonomous 
rel igious organization s .  The greater resistance of Lithuan ia to Russifi­
cation- -both demographi cally and l ingui stically--when compared with the 
other Ba ltic republics has its paral lel in the greater strength of t he 
catholic Church in Lithuania. Th e  Georgians have in many spheres been 
comparatively better able than mo st other Soviet nationalities to res i st 
Rus sian encroachment ;  the nationalist currents present in the Georgian 
Orthodox Church are the result of grass roots pressure . 
Laxity in one sphere may a l so be accompanied by laxity in the other.  
In Central Asi a ,  for example , the quiet reas sertion of ' nationalist ' 
at titude s is paralleled i n  a pronouncedly lax attitude toward rel igion-­
lax , at lea s t ,  by Soviet standards . Complaints continue to surface, 
theref ore , of "permi ssive" attitudes on the part of local officials 
toward religion and a certai n raikom secretary was specifically upbraided 
28 
fo r having urged that "rel igion does not do any harm . " 
Comparing Li thuania and Kazakhstan , one might note that the more 
aggressive posture of Soviet cultural policy in the latter i s  a l so 
r eplica t ed  in the religious sphere , for although both republics give 
prominent play to atheist ideas in the schools , atheist agitators are 
ac tive out side the schools only in the latter , not in the former. 29 
Hypothesis 8 :  There is � difference in regime orientation toward nation­
alists who are believers and toward those who are not . 
--- -- -
--- -- -- --
Atheist nationalists are , in a sense , mo re primevally threatening 
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bec ause they challenge the concept of the seamless web and discrimina te 
be twe en those parts of the package whi ch they accept and those whi ch they 
do not.  From the Soviet v i ewpoint , the erosion of religion is supposed to 
promo te the erosion of "bourgeois nationalism. "  To the extent that it 
doe s  not,  "bourgeoi s  nationalism" wil l  have shown itself to have 
add itional ( or pe rhaps , alternative) ideological resources . 
Hypothesis 9 :  The creation or suppression of ethnic identities i s  impeded 
by ethnically l inked religious affiliation , and hence the manipulation of 
ethnic identity requires the cooptation or manipulation of the religious 
elites . 
Th e  policy of dividing larger groups into a number of smaller 
groups , known as razmezhevanie , 30 divided Chechen from Ingush , North 
Ossetian from South Osseti an , Moldavian from Romanian , and splinte red the 
Mus lim nation of Turke s tan into a ho st of smaller groups , including 
Kaz akh s ,  K irghi z , and Ka rakalpaks .  In all these cases , new identities 
we re manufa ctured and pr esented as the "authentic" expression of 
s e lf-determination . In central Asi a ,  this poli cy targeted the traditional 
Mus l im identity . Two recent Soviet authors conceded as much , when they 
not ed that Islam continues to unite believers and nonbelievers within one 
na tion and to create a fe el ing of community between practicing Mus lims 
a nd those who had profes s ed  Islam (or whose forebears had done so) in the 
pa st. But , they quickly added , rel igious-based consciousness has nothing 
31 in common with the community among Soviet pe oples as a whol e .  All the 
same , central Asians often observe Islamic religious rites as assertions 
of their ethnicity--whi ch tends to unde rmi ne the new republ ic-based 
national identities they have been assigned by the CPSU and to set them 
apart from the rest of the population. Through manipulation of the 
coopted ulema ( "official I slam" ) the Soviets have endeavored to erode 
trad itional Islami c customs either by attributing them to pagan 
de rivation or by simply ignoring them as "backward , "  and to replace them 
with new " international , "  " Soviet" customs . Underground clerics 
( "unofficial Islam" ) are threaten ing in part because they continue to use 
th e traditional customs and ri tes and defy the efforts at Sovietization 
f . 1 32 o r1 tua s .  
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Hypothesis 10 : As certain groups assimilate � " social ist" traditions 
and ceremonies and lose acquaintance with their traditional ceremonies 
and customs , they become less threatening to the regime , or , to put it 
another way , seculari zat ion converts "bourgeois nationalism" into 
"socialist patriotism , "  by weakening tokens of particularity . 
In Armenia ,  as in other parts ,  the pe rformance of hallowed religious 
trcrlition s ,  including in this case pilgrimages to the Cathedral of 
Etchmi ad z in,  the sanctuary of Tcharchaban at Armash , and other hi storic 
rel igious site s ,  has the character not merely of pious observance but 
al so of ethnic loyalty . Thi s  ' extra-rel igious ' dimension to ritual is 
perhaps as 
d . . 33 �mens� on. 
troubl ing to the authorities as the ethical-doctrinal 
" Internationalization" finds in rel igion a clear obstacle , 
a nd thus secularization serves the interests of both religious pol icy and 
na tionalities policy . 
Soviet wri ter I .M .  Dzhabbarov expl icitly linked seculari zation and 
internationalization : 
A further developnent of the Soviet way of life and 
the reorganization of the everyday l ife of the Soviet 
people on a communist basis serves as an active fa ctor 
in promoting an intensification of the secularizati on 
of the entire mode of life and of fami ly and domestic 
relation s .  Even such stable elements of everyday l ife 
as housing , clothi ng , food , fami ly and marriage 
r elations and rites and ritual s ,  when they become 
sub j ected to the influence of the process of inter­
nationalization and of the Soviet way of life,  
gradually become free of  rel igious survivals .  As  a 
result of the internationalization of social l ife and 
of culture and everyday life there occurs a substan­
tial weaken ing of the connections and then a complete 
break ��tween the rel igious and the national 
moment s .  
The resu lt is the reinforcement o f  tendencies toward Sovietization i n  the 
sense of the dilution of specific ethnic culture . 
At the present time , thanks to the final formation of 
an Uzbek socialist nation , with the Uzbeks,  as with 
other nations , l ocal characteri stics in the materi al 
forms of everyday l i fe have not on ly greatly disap­
peared or been leveled out , but have been replaced 
predominantly by national [ s ic ] elements . This is 
witnessed by the appe arance in the vocabulary of the 
Uzbek language of many new everyday terms which have 
be en borrowed from the Rus sian flfld from other 
language s  of the peoples of the US SR . 
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Simi larl y ,  the creation of new socialist ri tua l s  goe s  hand in hand with 
the suppres sion of traditional Islamic customs in providing Sovi et 
ci tizen s  with a new s ense of " national " i dentity . 36 
Hypothesis 1 1 : By targeting traditional religio-national heroes for 
expurgation and suppression , Soviet nationalities policy converts atheism 
into � .!eapon of denational ization and tightens the connection between 
religious consciousness and national consciousness . 
Soviet hi stori ography celebrates Czari sm ' s expansion of the empire ' s  
frontiers a nd thus i s  at odds with the folk history of the borderlands , 
ma ny of who se political heroes acquired that renown through their 
. t . 37 Wh 1 . . 1 d . 1 ed . th re s1s ance to Rus s 1a .  ere re 1g1ous e a  e r s  are 1nvo v , as 1s e 
case especially in Central Asi a ,  but also in Lithuania and el sewhere , the 
suppr ession reinforces awareness of the national role of rel igious 
f igure s .  In the North cauca sus , for instance ,  Sheik Shamil , a Muridic 
imam, led gue rri l la forces in a 2 5-year war of resistance agai nst the 
Russian army , 18 34-185 9 .  A maj or revolt in the Andizhan Val ley in 
Kazakh s tan in 1898 , aga inst Rus s ian rule , wa s led by Dukchi Ishan, who 
sought to create a regime o rganiz ed on Suf i  principles .  There were al so 
rel igious overtones-- embodied in the catalyt i c  role of the ulema--to the 
wi despread Central Asian revo lt of 1916 , and to anti-Russ ian resistance 
throughout that area in the 180 0 s .  I n  Ukraine , the Russian a rmy was sent 
against the i nsurgents in the anti-Poli sh Kol ii rebel lion in 1 768 ; the 
leade r of the rebel s wa s Maxim Zal izniak ,  a product of Ukra inian monastic 
l i fe .  In Armenia,  national i st self-defen se groups began to organize 
themselves in Erzerum in the 188 0 s ,  with the knowledge and tacit approval 
of Khrimian,  the Armeni an Patriarch of Constantinople ,  and religious 
model s from medi eval Armenian Chri stianity and al so from Is lam later 
provi ded inspiration for the Armenian Dashnak guerrillas . And though 
ni neteenth-century Lithuanian Bishop Motiejus Valen?!ius did not believe 
an i ndepe ndent Lithuania was politically pos s ibl e ,  he is credited with 
having do ne more than any other individua l to nurture Lithuanian national 
38 consciousness in that century . 
Soviet policy has tended to be counterproductive in the short run , 
by inflaming anti-Russian and anti-regime sentiments;  whether the 
- 45 -
combination of demographic mixing , secularization , and Sovietization can 
ef fe ct the degree of social homogenization generally that has already 
been achieved to a large degree in B elorussia and eastern Ukraine is the 
challenge upon whi ch the success or fa ilure of Soviet policy in the long 
run will be mea sured. 
Conclusion . If there is a thematic current underlying these distinct 
hypothese s ,  it is that the Soviets do not view either religious policy or 
nationalities policy in i solation, but view both as dimensions of a 
broader program of communizati on ( "the building of communism" ) . Soviet 
so ciology of religion is viewed instrumentally , · as a means to develop the 
ef f . 1 . f h . . 
39 p t kh t . . mo st ect1.ve po 1.cy o at e1.zat1.on. As I . D .  an s ava pu 1.t , 1.n a 
1969 es s ay ,  "religious pre judices can be overcome only if we know the 
concrete forms in whi ch rel igion exis ts today , the [ pre sent ] state of 
1 ' ' ' d h nd ' d h ' ' t II 40 re 1.g1.ous consc1.ousness,  an t e te enc1.es towar c ange 1.n 1. . 
Similia rly , Sovi et "ethnosociologists" are entrusted with promoting the 
ch . d 1 . h . 
41 h rappro ement of nat1.ons an the evo ut 1.on of t e New Sov1.et Man . T e 
Soviet regime sees itsel f as fa shioning a new "Soviet culture , " 42 which 
is athei st,  bil ingual ( wi th Russian as the lingua franca ) , and ethnical ly 
converge nt , giving ri se to a new hi storical category , the " Soviet 
people . "  
Inter-ethnic problems af flict countries of al l political and 
rel igious persuasions--as the examples of Quebecoise separatism in 
canada , Sikh violence in India,  South Tyrolean discontent in Italy , 
Albanian irredenti sm in Yugoslavia,  and north-south problems in Chad and 
Sudan make clear . But whi le the Soviet sys tem cannot be said to have 
created its difficulties in this realm , nor has it made much headway 
towa rd solving them, whether in the sense in whi ch the Soviets themselves 
speak of solutions or in the sense in which Westerners might do so . 
Moreover ,  the combined ef fect of Leninist ho stility to both national 
divers ity and religious organizations in general is to strengthen the 
rel igio-n ationali st symbiotic bonds and to encourage both bel i evers and 
non-b elievers to view assaults on their traditional religions as assaults 
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